Abstract: The paper addresses the recurrent charge that Richard Rorty is a "linguistic idealist". I show what the charge consists of and try to explain that there is a charitable reading of Rorty's works, according to which he is not guilty of linguistic idealism. This reading draws on Putnam's well-known conception of "internal realism" and accounts for the causal independence of the world on our linguistic practices. I also show how we can reconcile this causal independence of things and the sense of our discourse being guided by them with our autonomy with regard to the construction of various "vocabularies" with which we describe, or cope with, reality. In the final part, I address in some detail Rorty's animadversions concerning the idea of the intrinsic nature of reality. I show them to be only partly successful.
The Nature of Linguistic Idealism
Linguistic idealism is usually understood as the thesis that "everything is language or that objects are only linguistic constructs" (Farrell 1995, 161) . There is nothing external to language, something that would cause pressure on it from the outside, and language does not represent a reality of extralinguistic objects, states, events, properties or relations. Sometimes this thesis is coupled with the view that since linguistic idealists believe our discourse is never constrained by anything external to it, they tend to equate true claims with those we like or prefer. On this second thesis, Rorty (1979) is adamant that the truthfulness of a claim is a matter of its being justified in front of the peers of our society. And to justify a claim when a challenge is raised is quite often far from trivial. This social conception of justification and of truth thus effectively deflects the "anything goes" objection.
Let us, therefore, focus on the first thesis. Rorty, to be sure, does not accept the label of linguistic idealist. But one can understand why the charge is repeated again and again in the works of his commentators. A number of Rorty's claims in various places of his published śuvre have a distinctively idealist ring. In Consequences of Pragmatism Rorty speaks of a certain "decadence", which his critics condemn, and which consists in the "unwillingness to submit oneself to something 'out there'--to recognize that beyond the languages of men and women there is something to which these languages, and the men and women themselves, must try to be 'adequate '" (1982, xxxix) . We are assured, on the same page, that "post-Philosophical culture" takes seriously the "ubiquity of language", and later in the book, Derrida's notion that language is "a reality in which we live and move" is endorsed (1982, 86f.) . Such formulations do, at least prima facie, succumb to the picture that the way we use language is completely unconstrained by anything outside of it, that we are "imprisoned" in our linguistic practices, as Rorty's opponents would have it.
It is, however, not entirely clear what Rorty aims to establish by these avowals. Does he just want to say that we cannot describe the world without employing some descriptions? Hardly, for this is a tautology, endorsed by any sane person. A more promising reading would stress that, according to Rorty, there is no way the world is separate from any human description.
1
This reading chimes well with Rorty's "anti-essentialism", a rejection of the intrinsic, humanindependent structure of reality, as well as with his "anti-representationalism", which denies that the point of our "vocabularies" is to adequately represent such a structure. According to the anti-essentialist/-representationalist, the superiority of a vocabulary thus can be only pragmatical, it can only consist in its being more apt to serve a given set of purposes, not in its being better at capturing an independent, ready-made reality.
The antirepresentationalist is quite willing to grant that our language, like our bodies, has been shaped by the environment we live in. Indeed, he or she insists on this point--the point that our minds or our language could not (as the representationalist skeptic fears) be "out of touch with the reality" any more than our bodies could. What he or she denies is that it is explanatorily useful to pick and choose among the contents of our minds or our language and say that this or that item "corresponds to" or "represents" the environment in a way that some other item does not. On an anti-representationalist view, it is one thing to say that a prehensile thumb, or an ability to use the word "atom" as physicists do, is useful for coping with the environment. It is another thing to attempt to explain this utility by reference to representationalist notions, such as the notion that the reality referred to by "quark" was "determinate" before the word "quark" came along (whereas that referred to by, for example, "foundation grant" only jelled once the relevant social practices emerged) (Rorty 1991, 5 ).
Rorty, though, intends to soften this radical outlook in order to steer clear of some obvious objections. He adds that even though we conceptually construct reality by applying various descriptions to it, the world still remains causally independent of our linguistic practices. This causal independence is to be understood in the following way: by introducing a word, say "giraffe", into our discourse we do not causally create giraffes.
I propose to look more closely into this idea of causal independence, for it is not entirely clear how we are to reconcile it with the fact that we construe objects, animals, etc., through our concepts. Rorty ponders the issue in his recent book Philosophy and Social Hope (Rorty 1999, xxvi) . He would like to amalgamate the following two claims: (A) Even if people never existed, there would still be giraffes (B) The causal independence of giraffes on people does not imply that giraffes are what they are independently of people, their needs and interests.
The second thesis--the "relativity of descriptions to purposes"--aims to establish that we speak a language containing the word "giraffe" because it conforms to our needs and interests. The same holds of words such as "organ", "cell" or "atom". None of these things is part of "Reality as It Is in Itself". None of our words ever "cut nature at the joints", for there are no such joints apart from all descriptions. To support this way of looking at things, Rorty speculates about what would happen if ants could use a language of their own. In this language, Rorty believes, the word for giraffe would very probably not exist.
The thesis of the "relativity of descriptions to purposes" is not uncontroversial. 2 For present, though, I want to focus on the first thesis (A). How are we to picture a world in which no humans ever existed but giraffes do? Surely we should not think that even if no being ever used the word "giraffe" with its present content that the world would still contain giraffes--this is precisely what Rorty is denying. By the same token, it cannot be that by introducing the word "giraffe", we are simply naming an object which would be there even without any of our descriptions; such a view would collapse into realism, a position Rorty struggles to avoid. The only reading I find plausible employs Kripke's (1972) notion of a rigid designator: we can imagine a possible world occupied by giraffes but not people. When we speak of giraffes in this possible world, we use the rigid designator "giraffe", which in this possible world has the same extension as in the actual one. But since there are no people in this possible world, we can say that the existence of giraffes in it, in no way, causal or other, depends on the existence of people in it--though giraffes in this possible world are conceptually dependent on other people, viz. us (we introduced the designator "giraffe" and are applying it).
Rorty and Putnam's "Internal Realism"
I am, though, far from sure that this is the reading Rorty had in mind when claiming that giraffes would have existed in the world even without people. I will therefore move to a conception which does not resolve the tension between (A) and (B) but which at least throws some much needed light on the alleged causal independence of objects and their properties on our descriptions of them and on the sense in which our descriptions are guided by them. The conception in question claims that once we adopt some conceptual apparatus capable of describing reality, then those descriptions which are made with the apparatus are true and those which are not ceases to be a matter of our will and starts to be determined by the causally independent nature and behavior of objects. This account is the gist of Hilary Putnam's "internal" realism. Internal realism, developed in Putnam's 1981 book Reason, Truth and History, is an attempt to strike a middle ground between idealism and "metaphysical" realism (according to which reality is a collection of mind-independent objects, properties and relations). The internal realist believes we cannot think there are things in the world before a particular scheme of description is adopted. Objects (and their features and relations) are thus taken to be internal to a chosen conceptual scheme or theory. But since internal realism is a species of realism, it remains to be specified in which way the human-independent reality contributes to our cognition. This contribution consists in the aforementioned fact that once we adopt a scheme or a theory, the truthfulness or falsity of our descriptions of the world is determined by the nature and behavior of the objects. And this nature and behavior is causally independent of what we think or say. We cannot describe reality in any way we please because our assertions are guided by what goes on in it. As soon as we adopt a vocabulary containing the terms "blue", "sky" and "is", we can utter the sentence "The sky is blue"; the truthfulness/falsity of which is determined by causally independent states of the world.
If we decide to adopt internal realism as an interpretive key to Rorty's views, we can explain the sense in which Rorty accepts that our discourse is guided by something external. This guidance takes place "inside" vocabularies, for it concerns particular claims made with the conceptual resources of these vocabularies. It is typically of a causal nature: states of the world can (and constantly do) elicit in us beliefs which we can express in our sentences. But, and this is crucial for Rorty, the world does not guide us in the stronger sense of forcing us to adopt a whole language with which to describe it. In this respect, we are not guided by the world but we retain an autonomy of designing the vocabularies for its description. 3 Thus, on the level of whole vocabularies we cannot make comparisons with respect to which of the vocabularies captures reality more adequately than others. This, I take it, is the import of Rorty's remark that all attempts to take seriously Galileo's metaphor of Nature's Own Language have failed (1982, 205) .
The similarities between Rorty's and Putnam's position run even deeper. When Rorty repudiates the relation of correspondence between language and reality external to it, he usually has in mind a reality with a capitalized R, a "rigid être-en-soi which stands aloof, sublimely indifferent to the attentions we lavish upon it" (1972, 661) . It is a world which even our most justified beliefs and theories could fall short of, a world of Putnam's "metaphysical" realist. Rorty believes that such a notion of a completely transcendent reality is more like an obsession than an expression of a sound realist intuition. We should not miss, however, Rorty's simultaneous acceptance of a more sober conception of the world which encompasses "whatever that vast majority of our beliefs not currently in question are currently thought to be about" (1972, 662)--"the stars, the people, the tables, and the grass". Once the two meanings of "the world" are sorted out, we can, with the help of the latter notion, give application to the idea that truth depends upon the world independent of our linguistic practices. Could we, in the same vein, say about those familiar non-linguistic objects that their states are correctly or incorrectly represented by our sentences and beliefs? No, Rorty believes. His notion of representation is so narrow that he would deny the claim. According to him, representation is always "picturing" of the sort in which parts of representations can be correlated one to one with the parts of what is represented. This relation is exemplified by some pictures and photographs but certainly not by many sentences and beliefs (Rorty 1998, 96 n. 29) . By the same token, Rorty would repudiate the notion of correspondence between language/beliefs and world. All he would grant is that true sentences and true beliefs are true thanks to the way things are (ibid., 94). We need nothing more to do justice to the sound, pedestrian realist intuition which we all share. Any more ambitious realist theory which would draw on the contrast between "in itself" and "for us" is unacceptable from Rorty's viewpoint. The production of true sentences and beliefs is a matter of purely causal relations between the world and our language: given that I am "linguistically programmed" (Rorty 1989, 6) in appropriate ways, the table in front of me can cause my belief that this is a table. Other, non-causal relations between language and world are strictly excluded by Rorty. This exclusion is reinforced by his insistence that language is just an evolutionary product which differs from other tools for coping with reality, say an elephant's trunk, only in its greater complexity. 4 
Scheme and Content
The adumbrated Putnamian reading of Rorty sits well with a number of Rorty's claims. Also, it can, through its emphasis on the causal independence of objects, save him from the accusations of linguistic idealism. The snag is that the proposed reading stresses the constructivist motive of our making reality by means of our languages. This talk of making the world seems to point in the direction of the distinction between a scheme of concepts and a conceptually inarticulated sensory content, waiting to be organized by the scheme. Putnam, at the time he was championing his internal realism, wrote in this vein that we "cut up the world into objects when we introduce one or another scheme of description" (1981, 52) . Rorty strives to avoid the distinction for he believes that Davidson (1984) effectively demolished this "third dogma of empiricism".
[P]eople like Goodman, Putnam, and myself--people who think that there is no descriptionindependent way the world is, no way it is under no description--keep being tempted to use Kantian form-matter metaphors. We are tempted to say that there were no objects before language shaped the raw material (a lot of ding-an-sichy, all-content-no-scheme stuff). Davidson, however, has shown us how to make our point without saying anything susceptible to that misinterpretation. He suggests that we stop trying to say anything general about the relation between language and reality, that we stop falling into our opponents' trap by taking seriously problems that owe their existence to the scheme-content distinction (Rorty 1998, 90 ).
Rorty, of course, does not want to deny that some objects such as money and bank accounts are socially constructed in the strong sense: the beginning of their existence can be traced to the introduction of specific social practices, including words such as "bank account". These social constructs, though, are not created by shaping an unconceptualized content but according to some physical objects, the social status of money, a bank account, etc. In the case of dinosaurs and trees, the talk of their being created by us is not equally harmless. We design and accept our vocabularies driven by our particular interests and needs but this does not mean that we create them by shaping an amorphous "dough of the world". Such a notion, Rorty came to believe, is just the opposite extreme of the equally deplorable idea that the world has a fully established intrinsic nature in itself. All we can say, therefore, is that if we had different needs and interests, our vocabularies and descriptions would be different.
Rorty on Intrinsic Nature of Reality
Let's take stock. It is not necessary to view Rorty as a linguistic idealist who denies any reality outside of human languages. According to the proposed interpretation, he insists that our use of language is heavily causally influenced by non-linguistic reality, whose nature and behavior is independent of what we think or say. And though he will have no truck with philosophical Realism, we have seen him espousing a sort of everyday realism concerning tables, stones and rivers. He also puts great emphasis on our autonomy with regard to putting forward various vocabularies. This emphasis, though, should not be seen as conflicting with the aforementioned causal pressure of the world on our discourse: the apparent tension is resolved by distinguishing between the level of whole vocabularies (where the pressure is absent) and the level of particular claims made by means of these vocabularies (where the pressure is paramount). And even if there is no intrinsic, description-independent structure of reality, we should not picture our conceptualizations of reality against the model of the scheme/content dichotomy.
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In the remainder of this paper I would like to look at Rorty's arguments against the intrinsic nature of reality. According to Rorty, the main argument against is the pragmatist thesis of the relativity of descriptions to purposes. Those accepting the argument see the scrutiny of nature as something aiming at the fulfillment of particular human purposes, not at the exact description of how things are in themselves (Rorty 1999, xxvi) . The thesis of the relativity of descriptions to purposes, though, amounts only to the claim that different creatures conceptualize reality in different ways. People describe a certain part of space as a "giraffe". A talking ant would, presumably, have no word for it in his language. Equally presumably, he would have other words with no counterparts in human languages. What is this supposed to show about the notion of an intrinsic nature of reality? I confess I have no idea. The ants are--understandably, given their size--not attuned to the existence of giraffes. But the fact that some concepts/words are missing in the language of some creatures certainly does not imply anything about the referents of a language in which the word does occur. Thus the fact that a talking ant does not acknowledge the existence of giraffes does not imply that giraffes are not a part and parcel of the intrinsic structure of physical reality that exists independently of our purposes, and indeed of our very existence. As Davidson (1999, 17) put it, our concepts are ours, but that doesn't mean they don't truly describe an objective reality. All we can safely conclude in the present case is that I and a talking ant use different words to describe different aspects of the world. And that is hardly a surprising result.
A somewhat different way in which the notion of the intrinsic structure of reality could be criticized draws on the claim that we cannot ever be stripped of our concepts--get "out of our skins"--and compare our descriptions and theories with the reality as it is in itself, unconceptualized. It is not difficult to see where this alternative strategy goes astray. A realist, believing in the intrinsic structure of reality, can actually agree with Rorty. He can accept that we cannot ever attain a position distinct from all our conceptual resources: we can only characterize reality by tracing a structure in it with the help of our concepts and theories. This, however, does not in itself put the idea of intrinsic structure in danger, as Robert Kirk (1999, chap. 9 ) makes clear. The realist need not revert to the idea of nonconceptual access to "naked" reality. I believe that this second Rortian strategy suffers from the same shortcoming as the first: what needs to be demonstrated, i.e., that reality has no intrinsic, description-independent nature, is just assumed from the start; it is not shown to be the conclusion of an argument.
So far, Rorty's criticisms of the picture of an intrinsic structure of reality do not look promising. Rorty, however, adumbrated yet a third strategy for inveighing the idea of world's intrinsic structure. In his polemics with Charles Taylor he puts forward an argument from our epistemic position. If I read him correctly, Rorty (1998, 91 ) asserts that we are never in a position to distinguish between two situations, viz. between:
(I) a situation in which we trace, with our words and concepts, a structure inherent in nature and (II) a situation in which we bring with these words and concepts a structure into the world, a structure which isn't there without them.
Even if we divided our descriptions of reality into two groups, the ones which line its inherent structure and the ones that do not, we can do it, according to Rorty, only in a completely ad hoc manner. There are no criteria whatsoever which would allow us to do it in a principled, non-arbitrary way.
This "inextricability" train of thought is not supported by any further arguments--Rorty just puts it forward as something self-evident. But in distinction to the former two criticisms of the idea of intrinsic structure, this picture of our cognitive predicament seems to have some persuasive force. Leaving aside social constructs such as money which would not exist without our conceptual interventions and focusing on natural objects such as giraffes and rivers, we can always confront the realist with Rorty's question: how do you know that this object is part and parcel of reality as it is in itself and not just something that is profitable for us to postulate? The realist could get into trouble, for it could transpire that he himself, having pointed to the lack of arguments in Rorty, does not have sufficient arguments to buttress his own outlook.
On the other hand, the argument on inextricability has a downside, from Rorty's point of view. Once we accept it, we move entirely beyond the dichotomy between the (social) making and finding of objects. And beyond any dichotomy of this sort, no niche is left for talk of linguistic descriptions being just ways of ordering reality that suit our purposes and nothing that would correspond to reality as it is in itself. In other words, it is the end of the idea, very dear to Rorty's heart, that all structure discernible in reality always depends on human interests, purposes and cognitive apparatus. If we cannot ever say which boundaries are natural and which are of our own making, we cannot dismiss, e.g., the idea that quarks are parts of the inherent structure of reality, though we cannot prove it either. The argument on inextricability does not refute the realist's picture of knowledge as incoherent or untrue; it just implies that the debates between realists and their opponents are pointless, for no party can decisively prove its point.
